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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this
case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-2(3) (j) and (4) (1953
as amended).

Plaintiff/Appellant timely filed their Notice of

Appeal invoking the jurisdiction of this Court within thirty (30)
days after the date of entry of the Judgment appealed from in
accordance with Utah R. App. P. 4.

Salt Lake County is the sole

remaining defendant in this action. Plaintiff is appealing a final
summary judgment order of Judge James S. Sawaya which disposed of
all issues remaining before the trial court.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether any evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact
that the width of Wasatch Boulevard with its shoulder could have
proximately caused Mr. Hart to collide next to the northbound
median line with a car driven by an intoxicated driver that crossed
into Mr. Hart's lane.
Appellee Salt Lake County agrees with Appellant's statement
concerning the standard of review. Salt Lake County will argue its
position citing evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable
to Appellant Mr. Hart. Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney. 706 P. 2d
614 (Utah 1985).

Salt Lake County disagrees with Mr. Hart's

assertion that evidence exists tending to show Salt Lake County
4

proximately caused Mr. Hart's injuries.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case.
Appellee Salt Lake County only disagrees with appellant Mr.

Hart's characterization on the nature of the case.
On December 24, 1986, Mr. Hart was injured in an automobile
collision

occurring

at

approximately

5800

South

Boulevard, a mountainous rural arterial roadway.

on

Wasatch

An oncoming

vehicle driven at a high speed by Robert E. Tweedy (Mr. Tweedy) , an
intoxicated driver, crossed over the center line colliding with Mr.
Hart's vehicle with a point of impact near the center median line.
Mr. Hart's lane was thirteen feet wide, with a four foot paved
shoulder and five feet of usable graded unpaved shoulder.

Mr.

Tweedy's vehicle was barely in Mr. Hart's lane, leaving Mr. Hart
with the rest of his thirteen foot lane along with nine feet of
paved and unpaved usable shoulder to avoid the collision if he had
the time to avoid the collision. Mr. Hart states that he tried to
avoid the accident, but, found the shoulder too narrow and opted to
steer back across his lane into the collision.

Mr. Hart asserts

that Wasatch Boulevard should have conformed to current standards
for the design and construction of new non-mountainous rural
arterial roadways.

Mr. Hart argues that if such standards were

met, he would not have opted to steer back across his lane into the
collision.
5

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Salt Lake
County upon the grounds that Mr. Tweedy was the sole cause of the
collision, finding no facts to support Mr. Hart's position that an
inadequate width of the shoulder was the cause, or a contributing
cause of the accident.
On appeal, Mr. Hart contends that the granting of summary
judgment against him was erroneous and that sufficient evidence
exists to create a genuine issue of material fact that the road
failed to provide him with an adequate escape route.
RELEVANT FACTS
1.

On the evening of December 24, 1986 at approximately 7:00

p.m., plaintiff/appellant Mr. Hart was driving his 1976 Toyota
Landcruiser northbound on Wasatch Boulevard at approximately 5800
South, Salt Lake County, Utah. (Amended Complaint para. 8, R. at
81, SL Cnty's Answer para. 8, R. at 103, Affid. of Bringhurst &
Wehrli para. 7, R. at 318).
2.

On the same date and time, Robert E. Tweedy was driving

a 1969 Ford Bronco, while intoxicated and in violation of Utahfs
DUI statute, Utah Code Section 41-6-44

(1986), southbound on

Wasatch Boulevard at 5800 South. (Amended Complaint para. 9, 18(a),
R. at 81 & 84, SL Cnty's Answer para. 9 & 18(a), R. at 104 & 105,
Affid. of Bringhurst & Wehrli para. 7, R. at 318).
3.

Mr. Tweedy's vehicle while traveling in patchy fog,

faster than the posted fifty mile per hour speed limit, crossed
over the yellow median lines into the northbound lane, hitting the
front corner of a Volkswagen van which spun into the southbound
6

lane and then collided with Mr. Hart's vehicle. (Amended Complaint
para. 10 & 18 (f), R. at 81 & 85, SL Cnty's Answer para. 10, R. at
104, Affid. of Reading para. 7, R. at 390, Tweedy depo. R. at 302,
Affid. of Bringhurst & Wehrli R. at 318-319, Affid. of Salazar R.
at 431).
4.

An investigation of the accident scene revealed no skid

marks or other signs of evasive action on the part of the drivers.
(Affid. of Salazar R. at 431).
5.

The point of impact with Mr. Hart's vehicle occurred next

to the center median line in the northbound lane. (Affid. of
Salazar R. at 431, Affidavit of Bringhurst & Wehrli R. at 319).
6.

The northbound lane is thirteen feet wide between the

median line and the painted edge of the lane. (Becknell depo. R. at
398-399).
7.

Plaintiff's expert measured four additional feet of paved

road beyond the painted edge of the lane. (2nd Affid. of Reading
para. 9, R. at 448).
8.

Plaintiff's expert measured five more feet of what he

considered a graded usable unpaved shoulder of the road. (Affid. of
Reading para. 8, R. at 390, 2nd Affid. of Reading para. 9, R. at
448-449).
9.

Mr. Hart states that when he saw Mr. Tweedy cross into

his lane and hit the car in from of him, he had a brief time to
react. Mr. Hart states that he reacted by driving right toward the
shoulder of the road, then perceived that the shoulder was too
narrow and "steer[ed] back across [his] lane" into the oncoming
7

vehicle. (Affid. of Hart R. at 444).
10.

With the accident scene showing Mr. Hart's and Mr.

Tweedy's point of impact next to the median center line of the
road, and the Volkswagen van going or having gone into the
southbound lane, there were no identified obstructions on the
remaining portion of the northbound lane and the nine feet of paved
and unpaved shoulder when Mr. Hart perceived and concluded the he
could not avoid the collision by steering toward the shoulder.
11.

Plaintiff's

expert expresses his

opinion

on ASSHTO

highway standards on rural arterial roadways, but, never has
rendered an opinion on highway standards on mountainous rural
arterial roadways. (2nd Affid. of Becknell para. 4, R. at 437).
12.

Wasatch Boulevard around 5800 South runs along the side

of a mountain and is a mountainous rural arterial highway. (2nd
Affid. of Becknell para. 4, R. at 437).
13.

Wasatch Boulevard along the area of 5800 South was not

designed, engineered or constructed by Salt Lake County.

The

County has only maintained the road since it was acquired by the
County. (Kano Affid. R. at 433-434).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Plaintiff's mistaken belief on a dark night with patchy fog
that the shoulder of the road was inadequate to avoid a speeding
drunk driver who suddenly pulled into his lane, does not create a
genuine issue of material fact that an inadequate escape route
existed, when plaintiff's Toyota land cruiser had nine to thirteen
feet of unobstructed road and shoulder to avoid the collision if he
8

in fact did have time to avoid the collision.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO
CREATE A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT THAT SALT LAKE COUNTY
PROXIMATELY CAUSED PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES.
This is a case where plaintiff/appellant Mr. Hart's mistaken

perception and belief is being asserted to create a genuine issue
of material fact.

Looking at the evidence presented by Mr. Hart

along with evidence Mr. Hart did not dispute or contradict, the
thirteen foot wide northbound lane of Wasatch Boulevard at 5800
South along with the nine feet in width of paved and unpaved
shoulder provided Mr. Hart with twenty two feet of usable road and
shoulder.

The collision between Mr. Hart and Mr. Tweedy occurred

next to the center median line of the road. Thus (taking judicial
notice that Ford Broncos and Toyota land cruisers don't exceed
seven feet in width), Mr. Hart had at least fifteen feet of usable
road and shoulder surface to avoid colliding with Mr. Tweedy. Mr.
Hart may have perceived that there was no escape route from patchy
fog hugging the mountain side or from a foggy windshield. Whatever
was the cause of Mr. Hart's misperception, he nevertheless had
ample space to avoid hitting Mr. Tweedy if in fact Mr. Hart had the
time to react.
If Mr. Hart argues that the Volkswagen van blocked the north
bound lane and part of the shoulder, he presented no facts to
support such a position.
into

the

southbound

lane

The Volkswagen van spun onto its side
away

from

presenting

obstruction to Mr. Hart's direction of travel.
9

any

kind

of

At most, one can

speculate that the Volkswagen for a split second swung over an
increased portion of Mr. Hart's lane as it spun into the other
lane.

Still, Mr. Hart had at least nine feet of paved and unpaved

usable shoulder, as well as whatever portion of his thirteen foot
lane that remained unblocked, which he for an unknown reason felt
was inadequate and steered away from.

If Mr. Hart steered away

from the shoulder from a miscalculation that the Volkswagen was
heading into his northbound shoulder, it would have been perceived
as an unavoidable obstruction where no amount of shoulder space
would have been adequate. No matter how the Volkswagen is viewed,
the trier of fact must speculate on why Mr. Hart, who asserts he
had enough time to steer back and forth across his lane, opted to
steer left "across [his] lane" and collide head on with a high
speed vehicle as opposed to keeping to the right and at worst
maneuver nine or more feet of unobstructed lane and shoulder to
avoid side swiping a Volkswagen that was still moving in the same
general northbound direction as Mr. Hart as it spun onto its side
into the other lane.
The

affidavits

of Mr. Hart's

expert, Mr. Reading, are

irrelevant and incompetent to this action since they only address
the width of the unpaved shoulder as being inadequate, which by
itself had nothing to do with this accident.

This collision

happened on the other side of Mr. Hart's lane next to the center
median line, leaving Mr. Hart at least six feet of his lane and
four more feet of the paved shoulder as an unobstructed escape
route before the five feet of unpaved shoulder even comes into
10

play. Mr. Reading never mentions the point of impact being next to
the median lane, or the thirteen foot lane and in his first
affidavit did not even mention the four feet of paved shoulder.
Further, Mr. Reading never considered how roadway standards are
applied to mountainous highways.

The highway standards opined to

by Mr. Reading concerned arterial rural roadways on non-mountainous
terrain. Wasatch Boulevard along 5800 South is on a mountain side.
Mr. Reading states that his opinion is based on Mr. Hart's account
of the accident, meaning that his opinion is founded on Mr. Hart's
mistaken and unclear perceptions of the events leading to the
collision.

Beyond a bald assertion that an inadequate shoulder

caused the accident, Mr. Reading never addressed the relevant issue
of how nine to fifteen feet of unobstructed highway and shoulder
space is insufficient for a six to seven foot (at most) wide
vehicle to avoid a collision.
twenty

two

feet

of highway

If Mr. Reading believed that the
and

shoulder

space

was

largely

obstructed, he never articulates what that specific belief is based
on

or what

the

obstruction

was, if

the

obstruction

had

a

predictable direction of travel or other material indications on
why five more feet of usable shoulder would have made a difference.
Finally,

Judge

Sawaya

sua

sponte

questioned

Mr.

Reading's

credentials as a highway expert since Mr. Reading is presently a
practicing attorney. (See Transcript of Proceedings R. at 505).
Mr. Hart and his expert have only presented unsubstantiated,
contradictory,

incomplete

and vague assertions

shoulder space causing the collision.
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of

inadequate

Viewing all the evidence

most favorably to Mr. Hart can only show that Mr. Hart was mistaken
in his perception and conclusion of the road and shoulder being
inadequate to escape the head on collision with Mr. Tweedy.

To

hold that such facts are triable would make governmental entities
potentially liable in situations such as when a person fails to see
and stop for a plainly placed stop sign, has a collision and
asserts the stop sign was not there because he/she did not see it.
Salt Lake County recognizes that on an appeal from a summary
judgment in the County's favor, the evidence must be construed in
a light most favorable to Mr. Hart.

Apache tank Lines, Inc. v.

Cheney, 706 P.2d 614 (Utah 1985).

Further, Salt Lake County

recognizes

that

summary

judgments

in

negligence

actions,

particularly when involving causation issues must be given with
great caution. Id.

Nevertheless, even in negligence actions,

summary judgments are still "a means for screening out sham issues
of fact."

Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1173 (Utah 1983).

Further, summary judgment is appropriate in situations where no
evidence is in dispute and but one reasonable conclusion can be
drawn,

or

where

specifications

of

bare
facts

contentions
calling

are

for

unsupported

speculation,

by
or

any
where

reasonable persons could not differ on the inferences to be derived
from the evidence. Massev v. Utah Power & Light, 609 P.2d 937, 938
(Utah 1980); Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482,
487 (Utah App. 1991); Dvbowski v. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc.. 775 P.2d
445, 446 (Utah App. 1989); English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154, 1156
(Utah App. 1989) . In the present case, Mr. Hart and his expert Mr.
12

Reading in their affidavits assert that the shoulder of the road
was inadequate to escape the collision.

These general assertions

are not supported by Mr. Hart's more specific description of
driving across his lane, which was thirteen feet wide, away from
the shoulder, which paved and unpaved was nine feet wide, into the
very collision he states was unavoidable.

The trier of fact is

left to speculate as to the possibilities on why Mr. Hart thought
he had no area of escape.
persons

could

The only inference on which reasonable

not differ, when

construing

the

contradictory

evidence supplied by Mr. Hart with the uncontradicted evidence, is
that Mr. Hart failed for some unexplained reason to see the nine to
fifteen feet of unobstructed space to avoid the collision or he in
fact had no time to avoid the collision.

Reasonable minds cannot

differ that the width of the lane and shoulder had nothing to do
with causing this collision.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Hart has not created a genuine issue of material fact
concerning any act or omission of Salt Lake County having caused
the collision between Mr. Hart and Mr. Tweedy.

Viewing the

undisputed facts most favorable to Mr. Hart, Mr. Tweedy was the
sole proximate cause of the unfortunate collision.
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Accordingly,

this Court should uphold the entry of Summary Judgment.
DATED this

2-V7^ day of December, 1992.
DAVID E. YOCOM
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY

David 0. McKnight'
Deputy County Attorney
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office
2001 South State Street, #S3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-3421
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
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